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After the dissolution of a firm, one partner has no power to bind the others by
executing a note in the firm name, even for a firm debt.
The assignment of his interest in the assets by one member of a firm to the other
members does not, zpsofacto, work a dissolution of the firm, but is only evidence of

a dissolution.
In an action, however, upon a promissory note executed in the name of the firm

by one member, after such assignment, evidence of such assignment is admissible as
tending to show a dissolution of the firm, provided the payee in the note had knowl-

edge of such assignment.
Where'the articles of copartnership contemplate a continuance of tie business
after the withdrawal of a member, by the partners who do not withdraw, such continued partnership cannot be considered as identical with the partnership theretofore
existing; and whether, if the remaining partners continue in business as a new

partnership under the old name, a member thereof can bind the new firm by a promissory note given for an old debt, will depend upon the circumstances of the case ;

c. g., whether the remaining partners, in their settlement with the outgoing partner,
assume the liabilities of the firm, in which case it seems that any member of the
new firm can bind such firm by giving a promissory note for a debt of the old firm.
But in the absence of such an assumption of primary liability by the new firm, it
seems that the authority to give the firm note for a debt of the old firm does not
cast.

from Dubuque Circuit Court.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.
APPEAL

S. P. Adams, for appellant.
Hurld

Daniels, for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ADAMiS, J.-The undisputed facts are that the defendants and
Atherton entered into a copartnership, under the name of Atherton,
Davis & Co. by written articles, on the 17th of May 1871. While
the copartnership continued they became indebted to the plaintiff
for the amount for which the note was given. The note was executed on the 1st of March 1872, by Atherton, by affixing thereto
the firm name. Before that time, however, Hlulbert had ceased to
to take an active part in the business of the firm, and he claims
that he had withdrawn from the firm and had ceased to be a member ofthe firm, and was not a member of any firm doing business
under that name. He also claims that Kingman had' withdrawn
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from the firm and had ceased to be a member, and that by reason
thereof, if for no other reason, the firm had become dissolved, as
the plaintiff at the time of the execution of the note well knew.
1. The first question arises upon the exclusion of evidence
offered by Hulbert. The evidence offered and excluded was that
Kingman, in January 1872, sold and conveyed his interest in the
firm property to his copartners Atherton and Davis. Hulbert
insists that such sale and conveyance, if made, worked a dissolution of the partnership, from which it follows that the note,
.executed subseqAently by Atherton in the firm name, was not the
note of the firm.
We ought, perhaps, to say in passing that it is not claimed by the
appellee, aud it could not be properly claimed, that where a partnership is dissolved one of the members can ordinarily bind the
others by executing a note in the firm name, though given for a
firm debt. The question presented is as to whether the sale and
conveyance by Kingman, if made, was a material circumstance.,
and if so whether, under the pleadings, it was competent for Hulbert to show it
In 1 Pars. on Cont. 197, the author says: "Any assignment
of a copartner's interest in the partnership funds operates ipso
facto a dissolution. This would certainly be true of the assignment "of the whole of a copartner's interest, and perhaps of the
assignment of any portion of his interest which required a closing
of the partnership business and accounts to determine the value
of the portion assigned." He cites Horton's Appeal, 13 Penn.
St. 67; Parklhurst v. Kinsman, 1 Blatchf. 488; 3itarquand v.
.. Y. Manuf. Co., 17 Johns. 525; Whitton v. Smith, 1 Freem.
Ch. (Miss.) 231. But it is difficult to say that an assignment of
a copartner's interest would in any case necessarily require a closing of the partnership business, and it appears to us that it could
not be held to operate ipso facto a dissolution. The learned author
from whose text we have quoted seems himself to have reached the
conclusion that it does not. In a note in the sixth edition of his
work he says that the true principle seems to be stated in Taft v.
Buffum, 14 Pick. 322. In that case it was held that an assignment of a copartner's interest does not operate ipso facto a
dissolution, and is only evidence tending to show a dissolution.
If an assignment were made under such circumstances as to require a disposition of the partnership assets and payment of the
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partnership debts, in order to determine the value of the interest
assigned, it would, we think, ordinarily, in the absence of any
other evidence, be difficult to resist the conviction that the understanding was, at least on the part of the assignor, that his connection with the firm was terminated. Such assignment would,
ordinarily, interrupt the partnership business. But we can easily
suppose a case where no interruption would necessarily be caused.
Suppose a member of a law firm which owed no debts, and wlh se
assets consisted solely of property of some kind which it had taken
for fees, should assign his interest in the assets. Such an assignment, it would seem, would not of itself cause any interruption,
and if the business should be continued as before it would not be necessary to suppose a dissolution of the firm and the old formation of a
new one composed of the same persons, and even in a case where the
partnership assets and liabilities are extensive and complicated, and
involved in more or less uncertainty, so that an assignment by a copartner of his interest in the assets would require the closing up and
settlement of the prior partnership business, it would be competent
to show, if such was the fact, that it was not the intention of the
copartners to dissolve the partnership, nor would it be necessary to
suppose, if they should continue in business without such intention,
that the partnership was dissolved and a new one formed.
In the case at bar the alleged assignment was made by a partner
to two of his copartners, and there was evidence tending to show that
the assignor continued to interest himself in the business to some
extent, and did not execute any paper showing a formal dissolution
until some weeks afterwards. We do not think, therefore, that the
assignment necessarily showed a dissolution. But it was not
necessary that it should, to entitle Hulbert to introduce the evidence. If the assignment was only evidence tending to show a
dissolution, it was not immaterial.
We proceed next to consider whether the pleadings were such
as to justify its exclusion, and we have to say that we think they
were not. We have already shown that the allegation of the
petition was that the defendants and one Atherton were copartners,
and as such executed to the plaintiff the note in suit. This the
defendant Hulbert denied. It seems to us that the evidence was
admissible under the issue thus made. The plaintiff proved the
existence of the firm prior to the execution of the note. The presumption of its continuance was sufficient to make a prima facie
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case for the plaintiff, so far as this point is concerned. But the
presumption of the continuance of the firm was liable to be rebutted
by evidence on the part of Hulbert of its dissolution. This he
was entitled to prove by showing any fact or circumstance which
had that tendency. It was not necessary -0or him to plead his
evidence to entitle him to introduce it. But it is said that the fact
of dissolution by the retirement of Kingman, if such was the fact,
could not affect the plaintiff, who had done business with the firm
and was an existing creditor, unless he had knowledge of the dissolution ; and it is said that Hulbert, when offering the evidence of
I-ingman's assignment, did not offer to prove also that the plaintiff had knowledge of it.
The evidence was not objected to upon that ground, and it does not
appear to have been excluded upon that ground. Besides, it appears
that Hulbert at another time did offer to prove by the plaintiff
himself that he had knowledge of the assignment. Now, while, as
we have held, the sale if made did not necessarily show dissolution,
and, as a consequence, knowledge of the sale would not strictly be
knowledge of a dissolution, yet any fact tending to show dissolution
must be regarded as admissible, if the plaintiff had knowledge
of the fact.
2. It is insisted, however, that the saie at most would only show
that Kiugman retired, and while ordinarily the retirement of a
partner works a dissolution, it could not have that effect in this
case, because the articles of copartnership contemplated the possible
retirement of one or more partners without a dissolution. It was
provided in the articles that a partner might withdraw at the end
of six months, and that the remaining partners should pay him for
his interest. It is not to be denied, we think, that the articles
contemplated a continuance of the business, and that, too, by a
partnership composed of the persons who should not withdraw.
But it appears to us that such partnership could not properly be
considered as identical with the partnership theretofore existing.
If there was a partnership after Kingman's withdrawal it was not
constituted as was the partnership theretofore existing.
Whether if the remaining partners continued in business as a new
partnership under the old name, a member thereof could bind the
firm by a promissory note given for an old debt, would probably
depend on circumstances.' If Kingman had withdrawn under the
articles-that is, if he had withdrawn at the end of six months,

,WALLER v. DAVIS.

and transferred to the remaining partners his interest, and they
had settled with him upon the basis of its value, estimated by
deducting from the estimated value of the assets the liabilities of
the firm-there would be much ground for contending -that, as
between Kingman and the remaining partners, the latter assumed
the liabilities and became primarily liable, and that, if a new firm
was formed by such partners, either one of them could bind the
firm by giving a promissory note for the liabilities, or any one of
them. But in the absence of such assumption of primary liability
it seems to have been held that the authority to give a firm note
does not exist. Spaunhoist v. Link, 46 Mo. 197. The evidence
offered for the purpose of showing Kingman's withdrawal was not
such as to show an assumption of primary liability by the remaining partners. The evidence, therefore, was not properly excluded
upon the ground that, if admitted, the result could not properly be
different.
Some other questions are presented, but, under the view which
we have expressed, it does not seem probable that they will arise
upon another trial. In excluding the evidence in question we
think that the court erred, and the judgment must be reversed.
The rule is generally laid down by the
authorities that the assignment by one
partner of all his interest in the joint
property to a stranger, ipso facto, operates as a dissolution of the partnership :
see Story on Part., P 307 ; 1 Pars. on
Cont. 197 ; Pars. on Part. 400 ; Jefferys
v. Smith, 3 Russ. 158; Marquand v.
N. Y. M1antf. Co., 17 Johns. 525 ; Horton's Appeal, 13 Penn. St. 67 ; Conwell
v. Sandidge, 5 Dana 210 ; Parkhurstv.
Kinsman, 1 Blatchf. 0. C. 488; Heath
v. Sansonz, 4 B. & Ad. 172 ; Milonroe v.
Hamilton, 60 Ala. 226; Saloy v. Alrcdced, 17 La. Ann. 75 ; Carrollv. Evans,
27 Tex. 262; Miller v. Brigham, 50
Cal. 615. The cases of M11arquand v.
NA
. anuf. Co., Carrollv. E vans, and
Horton's Appeal, cited above, are especially worthy of notice upon this question. The learned author of Lindley on
Partnership with reference to this question says, "It is generally stated that if
a member of an ordinary partnership

transfers his share, he thereby dissolves
the partnership ; but this proposition requires qualification. The true doctrine,
it is submitted, is that if the partnership
is at will, the assignment dissolves it;
and if the partnership is not at will, the
other members are entitled to treat the
assignment as a cause of dissolution :"
I Lind. on Part. 698. The assignment
to have this effect must, however, be
something more than a mere security, for
it seems settled that a mere mortgage or
other lien upon the interest of a partner,
does not, before foreclosure, effect a dissolution: State v. Quick, 10 Iowa 451 ;
Btiford v. Nreely, 2 Dev. Eq. 481.
Without, however, going into the fall
examination of the authorities upon this
question, let us examine the first question involved in the principal case a little
more fully. With reference to this point
,Ir. Parsons says, 11Whether a partner
has or has not a right to terminate the
partnership at his pleasure, it is certain
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that an assignment by one partner, of all
his interest in the joint property, to the
other partner or partners, operates at
once the withdrawal of the assignor and
a dissolution of the firm. For, here the
other partners assent to the transfer, by
their acceptance of it; and, therefore,
no question could be raised as to the
right of the assignor :"' Pars. on Part.
*400, citing Heath v. Sansom, 4 B. &
Ad. 175 ; Cochran v. Perty, 8 W. & S.
262. To the same point see Edens v.
Williams, 36 I11. 252 ; Cochran v. Perry,
supra; Rogers v. Nichols, 20 Tex. 719 :
Collier on Part.,
101. See also, 411cAdams v. Mlawes, 9 Bush 15, where a
two years' lease at a stated rental by one
partner to another of his interest in coal
mines operated by the firm, the lessor
thenceforth ceasing to act as partner and
to participate in the business, was considered as operating either to dissolve
the partnership absolutely, or, with the
assent of the members, to suspend it
during the continuance of the lease.
The case of Taft v. Buffum, 14 Pick.
322, cited in the principal case, was an
action on a promissory note to which the
defendants pleaded in abatement, that
if they made any such promise it was
with Horace Buffum as a joint promissor.
It appeared in evidence that Buffumn had
conveyed to another member of the firm
his interest in the whole personal and
real estate of the establishments operated by the firm, but that notwithstanding this conveyance he still continued a
member of the firm and transacted their
business in the same manner as before,
until the company failed; and it was
held (MoRoN, J., dissenting), that this
conveyance did not, ipso facto, dissolve
the copartnership, but was only evidence
to show a dissolution.
In Monroe v. Hamilton, 60 Ala. 226,
where the conveyance was by way of
mortgage, the rule is laid down as follows : ".An assignment by one partner
to another of his interest in the partnership property is not ipso facto a disssolution of the partnership. Whether it

shall so operate depends on its terms,
and the intention of the parties as from
these it may be collected. If the withdrawal of the assignor from the copartnership is contemplated, if there is a termination of his authority and duty as
partner and, as between him and the assignee, exemption from liability for the
future transactions which may be had by
the assignee in the prosecution of the
original undertaking, it is as to them a
dissolution.
But when the assignment
is intended as a mere security for a debt,
and is to operate only on the share of the
net profits of the assignor on a settlement
of the partnership transactions at the expiration of the partnership, and he remains bound to all duties as partner,
bound to contribute time, labor and skill
to the prosecution of the common undertaking, it will not operate a dissolution,
not even as between the partners themselves." Taft v. Buffum, supra, and
Buford v. Neely, 2 Dev. Eq. 481, are
cited.
See also, Matter of Shepard, 3
Benedict 347.
An attentive persual of the principal
case and of the cases above cited will, it
is believed, convince the reader that the
quotation above made from Parsons on
Partnership is to be received with some
qualifications, and that the decision of the
principal case is correct. Where nothing
appears to qualify the effect of a transfer
absolute in form, the assignment by one
partner of his interest in the firm assets,
whether to anpther partner or to a third
person, being primafacie evidence of a
dissolution, is undoubtedly sufficient to
establish the fact of dissolution ; and the
great majority of cases of assignment by
one partner are of that nature; but that
all transfers are not of that nature seems
clear, and where the evidence shows that
it was not intended to dissolve the partnership and the nature of the transfer is
not incompatible with its continued existence, there seems to be no rule either
of law or public policy that will prevent
the continued existence of the firm.
M. D. Ewnan.
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Supreme Court of Penael'ania.
PHILADELPHIA AND READING RAILROAD CO. v. STICHTER.
A railroad company has the right, by virtue of its implied powers, and without
direct authority being given it in its charter, to borrow money and issue obligations
therefor.
A railroad company, without any direct authority by the terms of its charter
to borrow money, propose to raise funds by issuing irredeemable bonds at a large
discount which were not to be entitled to interest until after the common stock
had received a dividend of six per cent., were then to take all revenues up to six
per cent., and were then to rank pari passu with the common shares for further
dividends: Held, that the right to issue such bonds was within the implied powers
of the corporation, and not ultra vires.
Where interest is payable only on a contingency a contract stipulating for its payment at a rate greater than six per cent. is not usurious.
Although a court of equity will not usually decree a specific performance of a
contract for the sale of bonds, yet if the proceeding be an amicable one, and be
purely for the purpose of testing the right of the defendant to execute the
bonds, the court will enter such a decree, if they are of opinion that defendant has
such right.
Mnioun, GoRDoN and STERRETT, JJ., dissent.

BILL by Joseph L. Stichter, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Berks county against the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, for specific performance of its contract to execute and issue
certain "deferred income bonds," in form as follows:

"PHILADELPHIA AND READING RAILROAD COMPANY.
DEFERRED INCOME BONDS.

Total issue, $34,300,000.
This is to certify, That

-

-

of

-

-

entitled to

the deferred income bonds of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company. Transferable only upon the books of the
said company in person or by attorney duly authorized according
to the rules established for that purpose, and on surrender of this
-of

certificate.

This certificate is one of an issue of $34,300,000, all of which
issue are irredeemable, and are entitled to interest up to six per

cent. only after a dividend of six per cent. in each year shall have
been paid on the common shares of the said company, and thereafter the right of this issue of deferred income bonds to farther
interest shall rank paripassdwith the declaration of further dividends upon the common shares of the said company.
VOL. XXX.-90

7,14
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Witness the seal of the corporation and the signatures of the
president and treasurer, at Philadelphia, this
day of
A. D.

The company demurred; the demurrer was overruled, and, the
company electing to abide by its demurrer, a decree was rendered
that it issue to complainant the bonds he had subscribed for upon
his paying for them. The company then appealed, assigning for
error the action of the court in not sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing complainant's bill.
@eorge P. Baer, for appellant.
J.saac Hiester and James -E.Gowen, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PAXSON, J.-We are in no doubt as to the power of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company to issue the "deferred
ncome bonds" described in this bill. So far as the mere borrowing of money is concerned it is not necessary to look into the charter of the company for a grant of express powers. It exists by
necessary implication. As a general proposition the right of private or trading corporations to issue promissory notes, bonds or
other evidences of indebtedness, unless restrained by their charters
or the law of the land, may be conceded. The reason is plain;
such corporations are organized for the purposes of trade and business, and the borrowing of money and issuing of obligations therefor are not only germane to the objects of their organization but
necessary to carry such objects into effect: City of Williamsport v.
Commonwealth, 8 Norris 487; see also Beinboth v. -Pittsburgh,5
Wright 278; Watts's Appeal, 28 P. F. Smith 370. I will not pursue the subject further ; it would be a waste of time.
There being no objection therefore on the ground of want of
power, is there anything in the form of the transaction to render it
ultra vires P We learn from the pleadings that in May 1880, the
company failed and passed into the hands of receivers ; that at the
time of such failure it had a floating or unfunded debt of upwards
of $10,000,000; that a large'amount of property, mainly stocks and
bands of great value, had been pledged to secure said debt, and
that said stocks and bonds were subject to the risk of being sold at
forced sales at-a great sacrifice; that the president and managers
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of the company, in order to pay this floating debt, and thereby
regain possession of the collaterals, determined to ask the stockholders to contribute $10,000,000 for such purpose, for which they
proposed to give them 834,300,000 of deferred income bonds on
which interest is to be deferred to a dividend of six per cent. on
the common stock of the company, and thereafter to take all revenues up to six per cent., and then to 'rank pari 'passuwith the
common shares for further dividend.
It will thus be seen that the stockholder who advances $15
receives a bond for 550, which is irredeemable, and which is not
entitled to interest until after six per cent. has-been paid upon the
common stock.
The objections that have been made to this scheme are twofold:
First, that it is usurious ; and second, that the transaction is not a
borrowing of money, but the issuing of a deferred stock, which is
beyond the power of the company.
It is sufficient to say in regard to the first objection that as the
interest on the "deferred income bonds" is payable only upon a
contingency, the contract is not usurious. -Non constat that the
company will ever pay anything to this class of bondholders. The
contingency which will entitle them to interest may never arise,
and is reasonably certain to be postponed for a considerable period.
There is, therefore, no contract for the payment of more than legal
interest. It is settled law that where the promise to pay a sum
above legal interest depends upon a contingency and not upon the
happening of a certain event, the loan is not usurious: Spain v.
Hamilton, Adm'r, 1 Wallace 604; Lloy'd v. Scott, 4 Peters 205.
This point does not need elaboration.
The second objection is equally without merit. The bonds in
question are not deferred stock either in form or substance. They
are certificates of indebtedness under the seal of the company, with
a recital that they are irredeemable; that they are entitled to no
interest until after the common stock has received six per cent.,
and after that to come in pari passu with said common stock.
They more nearly resemble a perpetual loan, with the interest
indefinitely postponed. The holders would certainly have no rights
as stockholders.
It is urged, however, that this transaction is not a borrowing of
money within the implied powers of the company; that the meaning of the word "borrowed" as applied to moneyed transactions
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involves an obligation to return the sum or thing borrowed. Thi's
is a narrow view of the subject. It is true we often use this word
in the sense of returning the thing borrowed in specie, as to borrow
a horse. But it is not limited to this sense.
Among the definitions given by Webster are the following:
First. "To take or receive from another on trust, with the intention of returning or giving an equivalent therefor ;" and second,
"to take from another for one's 9wn use ; to adopt from a foreign
source; to appropriate; to assume." We need not give the apt
illustrations with which the learned lexicographer adorns his text.
While the borrowing of money is usually accompanied with a contract for the return of the principal at a stated time, it is not
always or necessarily so. The object of loaning money is to obtain
a return in the shape of interest. The interest is the consideration for the loan, the hire or price which is paid for the use of it.
If I agree to pay $60 for the use of $1000 for one year, it is a
borrowing of money. It is equally so if I contract at the same rate
for the use of it for ten years. Is it any the less so when the contract is perpetual and the loan irredeemable ? The equivalent is
paid annually in the shape of interest.
We do not think trading corporations any more than individuals
are restricted in their moneyed transactions to the narrow meaning
of the word "borrow."
In its broader sense it implies a contract
for the use of money. The terms of the contract are within the
control of the contracting parties so long as they keep within be
law. I see no legal objection to a contract for a perpetual loan.
Such contract implies the voluntary advance of a sum of money,
repayment of which is not to be demanded, presumably for some
benefit or advantage to the lender. Such transactions are common
in England, and are not unknown in this country. They are
referred to in Union Canal Company v. Antillo, 4 W. & S. 556,
and in the Appeal of the Zoological Society, 38 Leg. Int. 403. I
am informed that the annuity bonds of the Lehigh Valley Railroad
Company are irredeemable. So long as the company pays the
interest, the principal is not demandable. If the Reading Railroad Company may not accept money from its stockholders as a
perpetual loan, I am unable to see how it could accept it as a gift.
It is observed that the borrowing of money is not the exercise
of a corporate franchise, or a power that is denied to the citizen.
Where a corporation seeks to exercise its franchises as when it
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attempts to take private property for public use by virtue of the
Commonwealth's right of eminent domain, we have a case in which
if the right is not expressly given it is denied.
We have the question remaining whether the contract should be
enforced in this proceeding. The bill was filed by a stockholder
of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, setting forth
the failure, the existence of the large floating debt referred to, and
that in order to pay this floating debt, the president and managers
" determined to ask the stockholders to contribute a sum sufficient
for such purpose in consideration of *the company agreeing to pay
yearly a certain percentage on the sum advanced, in case the surplus earnings, after paying interest on debt and six per cent. dividends on stock, should be sufficient for the purpose."
The bill then set forth the details of what is referred to as the
"deferred bond scheme;" that bonds to the amount of $1.9,655,000
have been subscribed for by the shareholders, and the residue by
the bondholders of the company ; that a sum exceeding $1,850,000
has been paid to the receivers on account of said subscription; that
the stockholders of the company, by the vote of a large majority,
have approved of the plan; that the complainant, who is a holder
of a thousand shares of the stock, subscribed for and bound himself to take and pay for his quota of said stock, viz. : bonds to the
amount of $50,000, but that the company has failed and refused to
perform its part and issue said bonds, although the plaintiff tendered full and complete performance on his part, of the contract.
The prayer of the bill is for specific performance.
The company demurred to the bill upon the single ground that
the plaintiff had not by said bill shown that said company had a
legal right to execute and issue the bonds referred to, and further
elected to abide by its demurrer.
As a general rule, a court of equity will not enforce specifically
a contract relating to personalty. The reason is that for the breach
of such contract an action at law furnishes an adequate remedy:
3te owia v. -Remington, 2 Jones 56; Poll's Appeal, 10 Norris
434; Appeal of the Zoological Society, 38 Leg. Int. 403.
We need not discuss the question how far an action at law would
be an adequate remedy for a breach of this contract, nor to what
extent the plaintiff would be injured by the refusal of an insolvent
corporation to accept his money. The case presents other questions of higher importance.
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If this were inpoint of fact an adverse proceeding, and the defendant company were resisting the enforcement of this contract,
we would hesitate to make a decree. But the proceeding, whatever
may be its form, is evidently an amicable one for the purpose of
settling the legal rights of the parties.
In this respect it closely resembles an amicable action with a
case stated. The demurrer admits all the facts alleged in the bill,
and suggests only the supposed illegality of the " deferred bond
scheme," with a declaration of submission to the ruling of the court.
That the plain object of the proceeding is to obtain the decree
of this court upon the validity of the bonds is not an objection, in
view of the fact that the case is a bona fide one, with real parties
having an actual present interest. And we can see substantial
reasons why this question should be put at rest by the decision of
a court ivhose decree shall be final. The property of the Reading
Railroad Company is of enormous value, and its development
enters largely into the business and prosperity of the city of Philadelphia and state at large. Unless some relief can be speedily
afforded, by which its large unfunded debt can be liquidated, the
interests of its stockholders, and, to some extent, of bondholders,
must be sacrificed. The ruin of such a property would be a public
calamity the extent of which is difficult to measure. The "deferred bond scheme" was intended to meet this difficulty. We
have nothing to do with its wisdom. That is a matter which concerns only those whose interests are to be affected by it.
It is enough for us to know that it comes to us with the approval
of the president, the board of managers, and a large majority of
the stockholders of the company. As we are unable to see that it
conflicts with any rule of law or public policy, we will not be
astute to find reasons for refusing a decree, particularly as no question has been raised as to the jurisdiction. And even if there had
been, the Act of Assembly which expressly confers upon courts of
equity the supervision and control of corporations would be ample.
If, as the bill avers and the demurrer admits, the stock and
bondholders of this company are willing to advance the sum of
$10,000,000 to save their valuable property from ruin, we see no
sufficient reason why they should not be permitted to do so. It
would not be difficult to demonstrate that it might be their interest
to make such advance even if the money were donated. That they
have reserved the chance of getting some of it back in the future
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in the shape of interest does not detract from the legality of the
scheme.
The decree is affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, at the costs of
the appellants.
MERCUry, J.-I
am constrained to dissent from the judgment of
the majority of this court. I consider it fraught with mischief
reaching far beyond this particular case. It not only affirms the
existence of a power not found in its charter, but one in clear conflict with the general law of the Commonwealth.
A corporation is the mere creature of the law. It cannot exercise any powers other those expressly conferred or necessarily implied in furtherance of the object of its creation. All powers not
so given are withheld. It is not sufficient that the officers or a.
majority of the stockholders of a private corporation believe its
interests may be advanced by the exercise of additional powers.
What the Commonwealth has not given to it can only be obtained
by virtue of legislative action. Power manifestly doubtful should
never be recognised by judicial construction. If not given by
plain words or by necessary implication we should declare it not to
exist: Bankc of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 7 Harris 144;
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Canal Commissioners, 9 Id. 9;
Commonwealth v. Franklin Canal Co., Id. 117 ; Same v. .Erie J
NMortheast Railroad Co., 3 Casey 339 ; Spahr v. Farmers'Bank,
13 Norris 432.
Whether this be simply a scheme to create and sell the "deferred income bonds" described in the bill, or whether, as seems to be
the fact, it be a device to borrow money from partial friends at an
exorbitant rate of interest, a court of equity should not lend its
aid in furtherance of either object. No specific power to create
and dispose of such bonds is found in the charter. It is contended
that it arises under an implied power to borrow money; that the
whole scheme is made lawful under this implied poweP. The claim
here, however, does not stop with the assertion of a power to borrow money at a legal rate of interest. It is blended with the enforcement of an agreement that for each fifteen dollars borrowed
the corporation shall pay interest on fifty dollars; in other words
shall pay twenty per cent. interest on all money so borrowed.
This is the specific contract which we are called on to enforce.
Not that the company may voluntarily pay this usurious interest,
but by decree of this court shall pay it. It is intimated, however,
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that the company -will probably never be able to pay this interest,
and this decree will be harmless. Such intimation rests on some
assumed principle of equity that I am free to confess I do not un
derstand. If the scheme be so uncertain of ever yielding any
return it is one of gambling, to which the hand of a chancellor
should never be extended.
The attempt is gravely made to maintain the agreement of the
company by asserting that a corporation, like a natural person, may
carry on its legitimate business by all legal and necessary means
not prohibited by law or its charter. We may concede all this,
yet the question before us is whether it may inaugurate business
not legitimate, and carry it on by illegal means prohibited by law
and by its charter. Can it truthfully be said the charter ever contemplated that the corporation should agree to pay twenty per cent.
to such of its stockholders as see proper to lend it money, and then
arrange with a person with -whom this agreement was made, to
procure a decree enforcing specific performance of the contract ?
In case of a private partnership composed of many persons, if a
majority of them should agree to borrow money for the purpose of
carrying on the business of the firm, it would not for a moment be
contended that one lending the money could, either at law or in
equity, compel the firm to pay that usurious interest. The attempt
here is not to give to a corporation powers equal to those of natural persons to make a binding contract but much greater powers.
The restrictions heretofore recognised as applicable to the powers
of a private corporation are to be disregarded by the affirmance of
this decree. I therefore dissent.
GORDON and STERRETT, JJ., concur in this opinion.
Does a corporation possess the same
power of raisint money to enable it to

distinction between corporations and natural persons upon which so many of the

accomplish its purposes that a natural cases proceed. * * * It assumes that
person possesses ? Assistant Vice-Chan- corporations must be specially restrained
cellor SAwDroaD says: "1A corpora- to prevent their exerting the same power
tion, in order to obtain its legitimate as -individuals., This is the direct oppoobjects may deal precisely as an indisite of the true doctrine:"
Curtis v.
vidual may who seeks to accomplish the Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9-268. This issound.
same ends :" Barry v. Mereants' Ex- The statement that a corporation, in orchange Co., I Sandf. Ch. 280.
Subse- der to accomplish its objects, "may deal
quently Judge SnwEN said: "This
precisely as an individual may who seeks
doctrine entirely overlooks that manifest
to accomplish the same ends," is mani-
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:e'-ty too broad ; for, if true, a railway,
banking or other company desiring to

raise money may deal in grain or stocks
upon the exchanges.
It might raise
money by "speculating in cotton, in
flour or other commodities with a view
of obtaining the nceessary means from
the profits of the trade." Per SPfLDEx, J.
Certainly an individual in want of funds
is at liberty so to raise them. A rule
so broad conflicts with the well-establisied limitation of corporate power to
corporate purposes.
The true principle is, that a company may raise
money by such means only as are expre'sly or by implication authorized by
its charter, among which means the
power of borrowing is implied.
Tlis implied power of borrowing
does not strike one objectionably.
An individual may borrow money; a
firm may borrow it. "A simple
association of merchants to build an
exchange, could, if they so agreed
with each other, very appropriately borrow money in furtherance of the object ;
and why can they not if they take the
principal power under a charter from
the government, which enables them to
act as a single person and with a collective will?" Per CO.314TOCK, J., in
Cartis v. Leav'itt, 15 N. Y. 9, 64.
There is no good reason why a corporation should not possess the power,
and that it does possess it is well established by many decisions. See Beers v.
Pl',nix Glass' Co., 14 Barb. 358 ; Partridge v. Badqer, 25 Id. 146 ; Clark v.
Titcomb, 42 Id. 122 ; Commissioners of
Crawn v. A. 6- N. C. Railroad Co., 77
\. C. 289 ; Tuc7r v. City of Raleigh,
75 Id. 267 ; Barry v. Aferchants' Exchange Bank, I Sandf. Ch. 294 ; Barnes
v. Ontario Bank, 19 N. Y. 152; Smith
v. Law, 21 Id. 296 ; Velson v. Eaton,
26 Id. 410 ; Bradleyv. Ballard, 55 Ill.
413; Lucas v. Pitney, 27 N. J. L.
221 ; Mobile, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. Talroan, 15 Ala. (N. S.) 474; Moss v.
liarpeth Academy, 7 Heisk. 283; CxVoL. X-XX-91
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ford Iron Co. v. Spradley, 46 Ala. 98:
Ala. G. L. I. Co. v. Cent. A. 6- M. As. 'n,
54 Id. 73 ; Bank of Chillicothe v. CGillicothe, 7 Ohio 415 ; Ridgway v. Farmers'
Banl, 12 S. & R. 256; 3lfagee v. Alokelhmne, 6-e., Co., 5 Cal. 258; Union
M. Co. v. Rocky Mt. Bank, 2 Col. 256;
Hfamilton v. Noe Castle, 6-c., Railroad
Co., 9 Ind. 359; Rockwell v. Elkhor.
Bank, 13 Wis. 653 ; Fay v. "Mble,12
Cash. 1; Commercial Bank v. Newport
Mwauf. Co., 1 B. Mon. 14; Holbrook
v. Basset, 5 Bosw. 147; Furniss v.
Gilchrist, 1 Sandf. Superior Ct. 57;
Bank of Australasia, 6 'Moo. P. C.
152, 193, 195 ; Forbes v. M1arshall, 24
L. J. Exch. 305.
See also, In re
International L. I. Ins. Co., L. R., 10
Eq. Cas. 312; Australia, 6-c., Co. v.
Mounsey, 4 K. & J. 733; In re German
31. Co., 4 DeG., M. & G. 19.
At various times the courts have
specified the express powers to which
the implied power of a company to borrow may be referred. Thus Lucas v.
Pitney, supra, refers it to the express
power to contract debts. "If it (the
corporation) may contract debts, it
would seem clear," say the court,
"that it may enter into obligations to
pay those debts, or borrow money for
that purpose."
So, also, in Bank of
Cldllieothe v. C7dllicothe, supra: "' And
really I cannot see," said the writer
of the opinion, "the great difference,
whether the corporation shall be indebted
to A. for labor in repairing streets or
buildings, or to B. for money borrowed
to pay A. for this same labor ; the moral
obligation to pay would be the same in
either case."
It is also said that this
power "would seem necessarily incident
to every corporation whose business involved the expenditure of large sums of
money, and often upon sudden and unforeseen contingencies."
In Curtis v. Leavitt, supra, the power
to borrow, it was declared, might be implied from an express power gave in
bank to receive deposits. But Judge
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thought that no power to bor-

row for a definite and fixed time could
be so implied since the deposits were
substantially call loans.
It was also
intimated that an express power to
deal in exchange implies a power to
borrow. And Barry v. Merchants' Eychange Co., 1 Sandf. Oh. 280, proceeds
upon the theory that an implied power
to borrow results from an express power
to purchase and to build.
Against the existence of the power it
has been urged that money borrowed for
a proper corporate purpose might be
diverted to an illegitimate purpose. "It
may be borrowed to build a hospital
and expended to build a theatre," said
Judge SELDEN (Curtis v. Leavitt, 15
N. Y. 9, 268, 269). But the same
might be said of a company's capital,
its surplus cash, or any of its property.
It certainly is no valid objection when a
company makes "calls"
upon its stockholders, or decides not immediately to
distribute but to hold and employ its
surjl s earnings, to say that the proceeds of such "calls" or the amount of
the surplus may be devoted to other than
corporate purposes.
An inchoate attempt so to divert such funds is enjoinab.t bythe state or the stockholders, and
a completed diversion of corporate property from corporate purposes is ground
.'or forfeiting the company's franchise.
All these remedies are equally as efficacious to restrain the diversion of borrowed funds.
The power of borrowing money is not
a franchise. It is a power belonging to
every citizen. A franchise, on the other
hand, is a special privilege conferred by
government on individuals, and which
does not belong to the citizens of a country generally by common right. "As
well may it be said that the privilege
of keeping their money in an iron safe is

a franchise or power:"1
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J., Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, 170.
The principal limitations to the power
of a corporation to borrow will now be
noticed.

LIMTIToN

I.

Parpose.-The loan

must be procured for corporate purposes.
This proposition is so well established as
hardly to need support by authority.
Davis's and Wilson's Cases, L. R., 12
Eq. 516, 5O1, specially illustrate it. The
objects of a building society were to
raise a fund for the purpose of enabling
its members to purchase freehold land
or other real or leasehold estate ; to
erect suitable cottages and other buildings thereon ; to provide the means for

the profitable investment of small savings ; and in cases of accidental death
to relieve the widows and families of
deceased shareholders by adding the
interest and estimated profits of the
current year. on the withdrawal of their
shares at the time of death.
The directors were authorized to borrow money "for the purposes of the
society," and it was decided that thi,
power was strictly limited to the purposes set forth above, and that persons
who had lent money to the directors
which was employed in a loan to another society, could not enforce their
claims upon the winding up of the
society, although it was also held that
the official liquidator was not entitled,
without payment of the money advanced,
to deprive the lenders of their securities.
See also, In re .Izat. P. JB. B. Society,
Exparte Williamson, L. R., 5 Ch. App.
309 ; and Laing v. Reed, L. B., 5 Gh.
App. 4.
LiMITATION
II. Amount.-It
has
been urged that a company could not
borrow more than its capital stock.
But Barry v. Merchants' Exchonge Co.,
1 Sandf. Ch. 308, decided that the
power of a company to borrow money
is not limited to a sum equal to its unpaid capital, and furtlier that when the
capital stock should be fully paid in,
the implied power to borrow did not
cease. The court reasoned that an absolute restriction of the power to borrow
to the amount of unpaid capital would
extinguish the power of borrowing whcn
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the capital stock was fully paid in, and
that such a rule would entirely deprive
incorporated religious, literary and charitable societies, which usually have no
capital stock, of all power to borrow.
Again, it has been urged that a corporation is limited to borrowing a sum
sufficient to accomplish the particular
purpose for which the loan is sought.
Judge SELDEx, in Curtis v. Leavitt,
supra, being of opinion that a corporation ought to be confined simply to running directly in debt for the materials,
labor, &c., which it might need to carry
out its purposes, said, "if permitted to
borrow, there is no limit but a volulitary
estimate, which may greatly exceed the
amount required." To this it may be
replied that the excess over the sum a'rually needed either can or cannot be
If it cannot be
profitably employed.
profitably employed, this is in itself a
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capital stock actually paid in and unimpaired, but since the section of the
statute following the prohibition pro-

vided that the directors should be liable
individually for any excess of liabilities
incurred above half the capital stock, it
was decided that the prohibition was
merely directory, and that debts contracted beyond the limit were valid
against the company. It was also decided that a corporation having received
the benefit of contracts made beyond the
limit was estopped from repudiating
them upon the ground that it had violated the statute in contracting. See also,
Gordon v. Sea . L.A. Soc., I H. &N.
599.
It has been decided that where a
company's power to borrow upon debentures is expressly limited to a specific sum, a debenture issued in excess
of such sum is void ab initio. PAGE
WooD, V. C. : " I think his (the exguaranty that it will not be borrowed.
cessive debenture holder's) case parNeither men nor corporations borrow
ticularly unfortunate; but the whole
money only to pay interest while the
money was raised, and I see no way
loan is idly stored in a safe. On the
of relieving him. I do not find that
other hand, if it can be profitably emParliament had given to parties dealing
ployed then the fund usable for corwith companies the means of knowing
porate purposes-no matter whether
used or not for the particular corporate
how much money a company had raised.
Every debenture should carry on it a
purpose for which the loan was madestatement of the amount of money that
is augmented by the excess, and it will
has been raised. How far the directors
be promptly and profitably employed. If
who do these unconscionable things may
the excess be put to any other than coror may not be personally answerable it
porate uses, the company is restrainable
is not for me now to consider."
at law. Where then is the injury re"As (the) debenture was void ab
sulting from lending a company more
money than it needs for the particular
initio, and the directors did not, as they
ought to have done, put him (the holder)
purpose of the loan ?
in a proper position, by issuing to him
No general rule can be formulated as
to the amount which a corporation may a new debenture, I cannot hold that the
circumstances of the company afterwards
But there are always one and
borrow.
having means can enable me to treat
sometimes two very effective limitations
that which was void ab initio as an exupon its power in this respect.
isting security :" Fotainev. Cannothen
I. Statutory limitations of amount.
R. Co., L. R., 5 Eq. 316. But to
These are frequently imposed by charter
or general laws. Thus in Ossipee H. 6- this it appears to be 'a good reply,
r
at least in American courts, to say that
W. 1f . Co. v. Canney, 54 N. H. 295, a
the company having received and used
statute limited the right of a corporation
the proceeds of the sale of the void deta contract liabilities exceeding- half its
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benturo is estopped from setting up the
nullity of the debenture in defence to a
suit based upon it: Bradley v. Ballard,
55 Ill. 413. See also Monument N.
Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mlass. 57 ;
Bissell v. Railroad, 22 N. Y. 289 ; In
re Pooley Hall Colliery Co,, 21 L. T.
(N. S.) 690 ; N. Y. 6- N. H. Railroad
Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 30.
2. Natural laws of trade. By this is
meant those limitations upon the power
of all persons, including companies, to
borrow, which arise out of the sagacity
of money-lenders, who do not commonly
advance more money to borrowers than
they can repay. "The laws of trade,"
to quote Vice-Chancellor SANDFORD,
in Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co., 1
Sandf. Ch. 309, "have placed an impassable barrier to tie power of corporate borrowing, in the tendency of
such institutions to make an improvident use of exuberant means, and in
the caution and prudence of capitalists.
It is utterly impossible for a corporation
with a known limited capital to accumulate by means of its credit the gigantic
property and power which the imagination of the counsel portrayed."

faith or the mere corporate liability, but

by mortgages on real estate : per S ANDFORD, A. V. C., p. 308, 309.
This case, the principal case, and that
of Taylor v. Philadelphia and Reading
Railroad Co., infra, are believed to
be the only cases where the time for
which a corporation may effect a loan
has been questioned or discussed. It is
believed, however, that there is a clear
limitation of the time for which a loan
maybe negotiated by a company-a time
limitation arising out of the very nature
Perhaps this will appear
of a loan.
more clearly after an examination of the
decision in the principal case.
First. Is such a transaction as that
designated in the principal case as the
"deferred bond scheme," a "borrowing" or loan of money?
It is true that one meaning of the verb
is "to use as one's own
"borrow,"
that which belongs to another ; to appropriate :" [ Worcester] ; "to take from
another for one's own use ; to adopt
from a foreign source; to appropriate;
[Webster.] But "borto assume."
row" in the sense of appropriation without an intention to return, is always and
Time.-It was ob- only predicated of words, phrases, rites,
LI-MITATION III.
jected in Barry v. Merchants' Bxpress ceremonies and things of no pecuniary
"These verbal signs they somevalue.
Co., I Sandf. Ch. 298, that if the com[Loce.]
times borrow from others."
pany never paid its bonds, they consti"Rites borrowed from the ancients."
tuted in fact a funded debt, "as irre[Macauley.] " To borrow good words
deemable, to all intents and purposes,
[Milton.] "The
and holy sayings."
as the national debt of Great Britain."
two idioms (English and Norman) someThe objector was a creditor of the com[Blacdpany, and the court questioned his right times borrow from others."
to moot the point, it being one more stone.] Nothing whose worth is estiappropriate to the interference of the mable in dollars and cents is ever "1borsovereign power of the state, but said rowed" in this sense. Indeed, such a
that the resemblance between the bonds "borrowing" of money or property is
more like larceny than loan, and the use
and public stocks was "very faint."
of the word "borrow" in this sense,
The bonds were printed or engraved,
with reference to the implied power of a
and had coupons attached for convenience in the collection of interest. There company to secure a loan of money, is
the likeness ceased. These bonds were simply sophistry-sophistry so palpable
and puerile as- hardly to merit exsealed obligations of the company;
bonds, in the technical sense of the posure.
A loan or a "borrowing" contem
word; and secured, not by the public
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plates a return of the thing borrowed.
"-A loan of money implies that the borrower may expend it, being bound only
to return an equivalent sum :" Abbott's
Law Diet., "1Loan." "A promise to
return the money borrowed is, indeed,
one among the ordinary indications of a
loan."
Per Mr. Justice JossoN in
Nictols v. Fearson, 7 Pet. 109.
Lord RrDn SDanA: " It is essential to
a loan that the money is in all events to
be repaid with interest by the borrower
himself, or out of his funds :" Lukey v.
O'Donnel, 2 Sch. & Lef. 470.
Chief Justice FOLGER, of New York:
"The idea of borrowing is not filled out
unless there is in the agreement therefor
a promise or understanding that what is
borrowed will be repaid or returned ;
the thing itself, or something like it of
equal value, with or without compensation for the.use of it in the meantime.
To borrow is the reciprocal action with
to lend ; and to lend or to loan, say the
dictionaries, is the parting with a thing
of value to another for a time fixed or
hidefinite, yet to have some time an
ending, to be used or enjoyed by that
other, the thing itself, or the equivalent
of it, to be given back at the time fixed,
or when lawfully asked for, with or
without compensation for the use as may
Le agreed upon :" Kent v. Quicksilver
M1fining Co., 78 N. Y. 177 ; see, also,
Cohioan v. State, 32 Ala. 582.
This " deferred bond scheme" came
before the United States Circuit Court
on a stockholder's bill to restrain the
issue of these and almost a hundred and
fifty millions of dollars more "perpetual
bonds," in Taylor v. Reading Railroad
Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 886. As to its being
a loan or "borrowing," Circuit Judge
McKEx.wa
said: " Has it then this
character?
I think plainly not.
It
does not propose to create the relation
of debtor and creditor between the defendant and the subscribers. The money
obtained by the defendant could not be
regarded as borrowed, because that im-
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plies reimbursement, and it is not demandable by the subscribers or payable
by the defendant. It has not the essential and distinguishing qualities of a
loan. It contemplates a stipulation that
the subscribers, in consideration of the
sums paid-not lent-by them, shall be
entitled to receive, in a remote and uncertain contingency, a portion of the
defendant's earnings, to be measured by
a certain rate per cent. upon three times
the sums paid by them, and after that
shall participate with the common shareholders in the division of the residuary
earnings. By what allowable definition
of a loan or borrowing such a transaction can be embraced, I am at a loss
to conceive. Nor will the fact that it is
to be evidenced by the sealed writing of
the defendant change its inherent character and bring it within the range of a
power to which it is not otherwise referable.
"In one respect, and in one only,
does the plan proposed resemble a loan,
and that is in the result to be attained.
They are both expedients for raising
money, but the method of accomplishing
this result is of the essence of the power
of the corporation. If its employment
has not explicit legal sanction, it cannot
be made available.
If the defendant
were offered a rental for its property
amply sufficient to relieve it from the
burden of embarrassment with which it
is now struggling, unless it could show
that its legislative creator had endowed
it with a right to make a lease, it could
not accept such relief: (Thomas v. West
.Jeirsey Railroad Co., t01 U. S. 82) ;
and although it has power to acquire real
estate for all necessary corporate purpose, no one would maintain that it
could lawfully enter into a contract for
the purchase of real estate merely to resell, and thereby realize large gains.
Authority to raise money by borrowing
does not imply the use of another and
different method of raising it, however well adapted to the end it may
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be. Even in the prospectus issued
by the president of the defendant (Exhibit 1), the proposed issue of "deferred bonds" 0 is not in any aspect
treated as a loan, and the system
is correctly stated to be new in the
United States, and to have been frequently adopted in Great Britain with
great benefit to the companies and to
subscribers. But we know that in Great
Britain this "system" is expressly authorized by statute, and hence it may be
assumed that such legislation was deemed
necessary to legalize a resort to it. Is
not this suggestive of the inference that,
although it has been proved to be of
great benefit in Great Britain, it is
" new" in this country because it has
been regarded as without necessary legislative authorization.
" I am, therefore, of opinion that this
issue of ' deferred bonds,' as proposed,
is without warrant of law." * * *
BUTLEaR, D. J., concurring, said:
"Every admissible definition of the term
borrow or loan, as applied to money and
commercial transactions, embraces an obligation to return the property borrowed.
A loan of money is universally understood
to be the delivery of a certain sum to
another, on contract for its return, generally with interest, as compensation for
its detention and use. To call this payment of money to another, who is to
receive and permanently retain it as his
own, in consideration for an annual
benefit or profit, a loan, would seem to
be a plain ;misuse of language."
"There is no such thing known to
commerce or transactions in money, as
an irredeemable loan in the sense here
Governments have issued
involved.
obligations without provision or stipulation for repayment of the principal
borrowed; but such obligations are redeemable at pleasure. Running, however, for an indefinite time, with no
power in the holder to exact payment,
they have come to be regarded as 'irredeemable,' and an investment in them

is, therefore, treated and described, not as
a loan, but as the purchase of an annuity
or stock. Aside, however, from the
abstract considerations involved in defining the term bor-row or loan, the corporate powers of the defendants to
borrow money must be held to apply
only to such methods of borrowing as
fall within the ordinary sense of the
term-as understood by the community,
and illustrated in commercial transactions. Applying this test to the proposition here under consideration, it
becomes plain that the transaction contemplated is not a loan."
The nature of the transaction is
thus stated by Judge BUTLER: "The
certificate proposed to be issued would
vest in the owner a joint interest
with the common stockholder in the
capital or property of the corporation, an
interest purchased with his money, the
earnings of which would be paid to him
in dividends. In every essential respect, therefore, lie would be a stockholder. The circumstance that he could
not vote for directors would not change
the character of his interest, or the
nature of ris relation to the company
and its property. His situation would
be similar to that of a silent partner in
a commercial firm. The proposition,
therefore, is for the sale of interests in
the capital of the corporation-a sale of
shares, shorn of the privilege of voting,
with the right to dividends regulated by
contract."
The conclusion is that there is a time
limitation upon the implied power of corporations to borrow money; because
a "borrowing" of money implies a return, which must of course take place at
some time, prescribed or possible of ascertainment.
Second. Is not such an issue of "irredeemable bonds" unconstitutional, as
impairing the contract between the company and such of the stockholders as
do not assent to it ?
What are the rights of bondholders
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creditors and stockholders in the net
earnings of a company? They are
these: Bondholders and other creditors,
secured or otherwise, are entitled to be
paid their interest, and the principal of
such debts as are mature. Preferred
stockholders (if there be any) are entitled to their dividends. And after all
these are provided for, common shareholders have a right under their contract
with the company to have the remainder
of the net earnings distributed among
them as dividends. These 'rights are
vested, and unless power so to do has
been reserved to, or constitutionally conferre'd upon, the company, it cannot
divest or subtract from shareholders'
rights without their consent.
" Shares of stock are in the nature of
choses in action, and give the holder a
fixed right in the division of the profits
of a company so long as it exists, and of
its effects when it is dissolved. That
right is as inviolable as is any right in
property, and can no more be taken
away or lessened, against the will of the
owner than can any other right, unless
power is reserved in the first instance,
when it enters into the constitution of
the right, or is properly derived afterwards from a superior law-giver." Per
F'OLGn, 0. J., in Kent v. Quicksilver
Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 179; and see
Mechanics' Bard v. N . . 6 N. .
Railroad Co., 13 N. Y. 599-627. Yet
this "deferred bond scheme" contemplates first a limitation of the dividends
of common stockholders to 6 per cent.
Then the surplus remaining after this is
paid is to be used to pay 6 per cent. on
these "bonds," and the holders of these
are finally to share, par passu, with the
common stockholders any balance of the
surplus profits remaining undistributed.
By this plan the common shareholders,
notwithstanding they have a clear right
to the whole of the surplus profits of the
company remaining after the matured
claims of creditors and preferred shareholders are satisfied, are to be compelled
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perpetually to share that surplus witl'
the holders of these "deferred incoms
bonds."
This deprives such shareholders of a portion of the profits to which
they are entitled under their contract
with the company to take its stock. It
impairs that contract. It is unconstitutional, and the majority of the stockholdders cannot bind any minority, however small, to any such agreement.
The case is analogous to Kent v.
Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159.
There the company was in need of
funds, and a by-law was adopted providing that stockholders who should
surrender *cir certificates and pay $5
on each share of stock, should be entitled to the same number of shares of
a preferred stock drawing 7 per cent.
interest, to be paid out of the profits of
the company. Any surplus thereafter
was to be divided pro rota among comThe
mon and preferred shareholders.
transaction was decided not to be a borrowing, and to be ultra vices of the company because it impaired the contract
rights of the common shareholders.
The unconstitutionality of this "perpetual bond scheme" is the same, even
considering it as a loan. It must be
remembered that to borrow or to go in
debt are but temporary expedients to
accomplish corporate purposes.
Subscribers for stock buy it in contemplation of the eventual payment of such
debts as may be necessarily incurred by
the company, so that interest shall cease
to absorb profits which should be distributed as dividends. But by this
scheme the company may become abundantly able to pay all its debts, and thus
to stop the diversion of profits from
dividends to interest, and still the profits
distributable as dividends will be used
for interest. This is in derogation of
the shareholder's contracts. Their right
is to have the debts paid so soon as is
practicable, in order that they may themselves secure, in the shape of dividends
what is paid to creditors as interest.
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It is condluded, therefore, that stockholders have a right to hare corporate
debts paid as soon as practicable, in order
that corporate profits mar be distributed
as dividends instead of being paid out as
interest ; and, further, that any diversion
of profits agreed to be distributed as
dividends is an unconstitutional impairment of the stockholder's contract, unless
lie consent to such diversion.
In the principal case some reliance is
placed upon Union Canal Co. v. Antillo,
4 W. & S. 553. There a certificate of
loan was issued in 1830 by a company, that there was due from it to
Antillo, or her assigns, a certain sum,
learing interest at 6 per cent. per annum, payable quarterly on certain days,
the principalto be redeemable in the option
of the company, at anytime after January
1st 1840 ; and further stating that it
was issued under a resolution of the
company, and that the holder would be
entitled to convert the whole of said sum
into shares of the capital stock of the
company at any time previous to January
Ist 1840.
It was decided that this created an
annuity coupled with a power to redeem
after January 1st 1840, the company
alone having power after that time to
determine when the loan shall be repaid,
and that an action would not lie to compel
payment of the principal against the will
of the company, its affairs having terminated disastrously.

The Antillo case is distinguishable
from the principal case. In the former
the bonds were expressly redeemable at
the option of the company. This option
might be exercised, and a saving of
interest effected for the stockholders at
any time the company became able to
pay its debts. Not so in the principal
case. In it the bonds are irredeemable
whether the company fail or flourish,
and stocklolders-whether the company
is able to pay its debts or not-are always to have a portion of its surplus
earnings dissipated in interest. They
are, by the " deferred bond scheme," left
unprotected in the very respect wherein
their rights were fully guarded by the
A&ntillo contract.
The company in the Antlllo ease contemplated a redemption at its option,
and so also did the court, for it said in
deciding the case: " thus, if the rate
of interest be reduced, it would be to
the benefit of the company to open a
new loan and repay the amount borrowed ; but if there should be no change
in the value of money, then it was to be
at their option to continue the contract
on the same terms."
This case is no
authority for an irredeemable loan as
against the company. The difference
between the two contracts is clear,
material and important.
AiELBERT HAMILTON
Chicago.

8upreme Court of Connecticut.
IN RtE MARY HALL.
Under a statute providing that " the Superior Court may admit and cause to be
sworn as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules
established by the judges of said court, and no other person than an attorney so
admitted shall plead at the bar of any court of this state, except in his own cause,"
a woman who has complied with the rules as to examination, &c., and found
qualified, may legally be admitted as an attorney.

TiS was an application by a woman for admission to the bar

of Hartford county.

After having completed the prescribed term
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of study she passed the examination required by the rules of the
bar, and was recommended by the bar of the county to the Superior
Court for adriission, subject to the opinion of the court upon the
question whether as a woman she could legally be admitted. The
Superior Court reserved the case for the advice of the Supreme
Court.
J. Hooker and T. HIelianus, for applicant.
C.

oilier, eontra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-The statute with regard to the admission of attorneys by the court is the 29th section of chapter 3, title 4, of the
General Statutes, and is in the following words: "The Superior
Court may admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such persons
a-s are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established by the
judges of said court; and no other person than an attorney so
admitted shall plead at the bar of any court of this state, except
in his own cause."
It is not contended, in opposition to the application, that the
language of this statute is not comprehensive enough to include
women, but the claim is that at the time it was passed its application to women was not thought of, while the fact that women have
never been admitted as attorneys, either by the English courts or
by any of the courts of this country, had established a commonlaw disability, which could be removed only by a statute intended to
have that effect.
It is hardly necessary to consider how far the fact that women
have never pursued a particular profession or occupied a particular
official position, to the pursuit or occupancy of which some governmental license or authority was necessary, constitutes a commonlaw disability for receiving such license or authority, because here
the statute is ample for removing that disability if we can construe
it as applying to women, so that we come back to the question
whether we are by construction to limit the application of the
statute to men alone,-by reason of the fact that in its original
enactment its application to women was not intended by the
legislators that enacted it.
And upon this point we remark, in the first place, that an
inquiry of this sort involves very serious difficulties. No one
PARK,
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would doubt that a statute passed at this time in the same word.
would be sufficient to authorize the admission of women to the bar,
because it is now a common fact and presumably ii the minds of
legislators, that women in different parts of the country are and
for some time have been following the profession of law. But if
we hold that the construction of the statute is to be determined by
the admitted fact that its application to women was not in the
minds of the legislators when it was passed, where shall we draw
the line ? All progress in social matters is gradual. We pass,
almost imperceptibly, from a state of public opinion that utterly
condemns some course of action to one that strongly approves it.
At what point in the history of this change shall we regard a
statute, the construction of which is to be affected by it, as passed
in contemplation of it? When the statute we are now considering
was passed it probably never entered the mind of a single member
of the legislature, that black men would ever be seeking for admission under it. Shall we now hold that it cannot apply to black
men ? We know of no distinction in respect to this rule between
the case of a statute and that of a constitutional provision. When
our state constitution was adopted in 1818, it was provided in it
that every elector should be "elegible to any office in the state,"
except where otherwise provided in the constitution. It is clear
that the convention that framed and probably all the people who
voted to adopt that constitution, had no idea that black men would
ever be electors, and contemplated only white men as within any
possible application of the provisibn, for the same constitution provided that only white men should be electors. But now that black
men are made electors will it do to say that they are not entitled to
the full rights of electors in respect to holding office, because an
application of the provision to them was never thought of when it
was adopted ? Events that gave rise to enactments may always be
considered in construing them. This is little more than the
familiar rule that in construing a statute we always inquire what
particular mischief it was designed to remedy. Thus the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that in construing the recent
amendments of the Federal Constitution, although they are general
in their terms, it is to be considered that they were passed with
reference to the exigencies growing out of the emancipation of the
slaves, and for the purpose of benefiting the blacks: fflaughter
HYouse Cases, 16 Wall. 67'; Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U. S.
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Rep. 806. But this statute was not passed for the purpose of
benefiting men as distinguished from women. It grew out of no
exigency caused by the relation of the sexes. Its object was
wholly to secure the orderly trial of causes and the better administration of justice. Indeed the preamble to the first statute providing for the admission of attorneys, states its object to be "for
the well ordering of proceedings and pleas at the bar."
The statute on this subject was not originally passed in its present form. The first act with regard to the admission of attorneys
was that of 1708, which was as follows: " That no person, except
in his own cause, shall be admitted to make any plea at the bar
without being first approved by the court before whom the plea is
to be made, nor until he shall take in the said court the following
oath," &c.: Col. Records, 1706 to 1716, p. 48. This act seems to
have contemplated an approval by the court in each particular case
in which an attorney appeared before it. The first act with regard
to the general admission of attorneys appears in the revision of
1750, and is as follows: "That the county courts of the respective
counties in this colony shall appoint, and they are hereby empowered to approve, nominate and appoint attorneys in their respective
counties as there shall be occasion, to plead at the bar ; " * * and
that no person, except in his own case, shall make any plea at the
bar in any court but such as are allowed and qualified attorneys as
aforesaid." Thus the statute stood until the revision of 1821,
when for the first time it took essentially its present form. Up to
this time the word "person" had. been used in this statute only in
the clause that "no person" should be allowed to practice before the
courts except where formally admitted by the court, a use of
the word which of course could not be regarded as limited to the
male sex, as women would undoubtedly have been held to be included in the term. The language of the statute as now adopted
was as follows: " The county courts may make such rules and regulations as to them shall seem proper, relative to the admission and
practice of attorneys; and may approve of, admit and cause to be
sworn as attorneys, such persons as are qualified therefor, agreeably
to the rules establishdd; * * *.and no person not thus admitted,
except in his own cause, shall be admitted or allowed to plead at
The statute in this form passed through
the bar of any court."
the compilations of 1835 and 1838, the revision of 1849 and the
compilation of 1854, and appears, with a slight modification, in the
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revision of 1866. The county courts had now been abolished, and
the power to admit attorneys, as well as to make rules on tue
subject, had been given to the Superior Court; the expression
"such persons" being preserved, and the provision that "no person" not thus admitted should be allowed to plead, being omitted.
The statute finally took its present form in the revision of 1875.
Itretains the provision that the Superior Court may make rules
for the admission of attorneys, and provides that the court "may
admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys suchpersons as are qualified therefor agreeably to the rules established," and restores the
provision, dropped in the revision of 1866, that "no person other
than an attorney so admitted shall plead at the bar of any court in
this state, except in his own cause."
These changes, though not such as to change the meaning of the
statute at any point of importance to the present question, are yet
not wholly without importance. The adoption by the legislature
of a revision of the statutes becomes, both in law and in fact, a reenactment of the whole body of statutes; and though, in determining the meaning of a statute, we are not to regard it as then
enacted for the first time, especially if there be no change in its
phraseology, yet, where there is such a change, it follows that the
attention of the revisers had been particularly directed to that statute, as of course also that of the legislature, and that with the
changes made it expresses the present intent of both. Thus, in
this case, it is clear that the revisers gave particular thought to the
phraseology of the statute we are'considering, and put it in a form
that seemed to them best with reference to the present state of
things, and decided to leave the words "such persons" to stand,
with full knowledge that they were sufficient to include women, and
that women were already following the profession of law in different
parts of the country. The legislators must be presumed to have
acted with the same consideration and knowledge. It would have
been perfectly easy, if either had thought best, to insert some words
of limitation or exclusion, but it was not done. Not only so, but
a clause omitted in the revision of 1866 was restored, providing
that no "person" not regularly admitted shold act as an attorney,
a term which necessarily included women, and the insertion of which
made it necessary, if the word "persons" as used in the first part
of the statute should be held not to include women, to give two

IN RE MARY HALL.

entirely different meanings to the same word where occurring twice
in the same statute and with regard to the same subject-matter.
The object of a revision of the statutes is, that there may be such
changes made in them as the changes in political and social matters
may demand, and where no changes are made in a statute it is to be
presumed that the legislature is satisfied with it in its present form.
And where some changes are made in a particular statute and other
parts of it are left unchanged, there is the more reason for the inference, from this evidence, that the matter of changing the statute
was especially considered, that the parts unchanged express the
legislative will of to day, rather than, that of perhaps a hundred
years ago, when it was originally enacted.
But this statute, in the revision of 1875, is placed immediately
after another with regard to the appointment of commissioners
of the Superior Court, the necessary construction of which, we
think, throws light upon the construction of the statute in question.
That act was passed in 1855, after women had begun, with general
acceptance, to occupy a greatly enlarged field of industry, and
some professional and even public positions ; and it has been held,
by the Superior Court, very properly we think, as applying to
women, a woman having three years ago been appointed a commissioner under it. Its language is as follows: "1The Superior Court
in any county may appoint any number of persons in such county
to be commissioners of the Superior Court, who, when sworn, may
sign writs and subpoenas, take recognisances, administer oaths and
take depositions and the acknowledgment of deeds, and shall hold
office for two years from their appointment." Here the very languago is used which is used in the statute with regard to attorneys.
In one it is "any number of persons," in the other "such persons
as are qualified." These two statutes are placed in immediate juxtaposition in the revision of 1875 and deal with kindred subjects,
and it is reasonable to presume that the revisers and the legislature
intended both to receive the same construction. It would seem
strange to any common-sense observer that an entirely different
meaning should be given to the same word in the two statutes, especially when in giving the narrower meaning to the word in the
statute with regard to attorneys, we are compelled to give it a different meaning from that which the same word requires in the next
line of the same statute.
We are not to forget that all statutes are to be construed, so far
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as possible, in favor of equality of rights.

All restrictions upon

human liberty, all claims for special privileges, are to be regarded
as having the presumption of law against them, and as standing
upon their defence, and can be sustained, if at all by valid legislation, only by the clear expression or clear implication of the law.
We have some noteworthy illustrations of the recognition of
women as eligible or appointable to office under statutes of which
the language is merely general. Thus, women are appointed in all
parts of the country as postmasters. The Act of Congress of 1825
was the first one conferring upon the postmaster-general the power
of appointing postmasters, and it has remained essentially unchanged to the present time. The language of the act is that,
"the postmaster-general shall establish post offices and appoint
postmasters." Here women are not included except in the general
term "1postmasters," a term which seems to imply a male person;
and no legislation from 1825 down to the present time authorizes
the appointment of women, nor is there any reference in terms to
women until the revision of 1874, which recognises the fact that
women had already been appointed, in providing that " the bond of
any married woman who may be appointed postmaster shall be
binding on her and her sureties."
Some of the higher grades of
postmaster are appointed by the president, subject to confirmation
by the senate, and such appointments and confirmations have repeatedly been made. The same may be said of pension agents.
The acts of Congress on the subject have simply authorized "the
president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to appoint all pension agents, who shall hold their offices for the term of
four years, and shall give bond," &c. At the last session of Congress a married woman in Chicago was appointed, for a third term,
pension agent for the state of Illinois, and the public papers stated
that there was not a single vote against her confirmation in the
senate. Public opinion is everywhere approving of such appointments. They promote the public interest, which is benefited by
every legitimate use of individual ability, while mere justice, which
is of interest to all, requires that all have the fullest opportunity
for the exercise of their abilities. These cases.are the more noteworthy as being cases of public offices, to which the incumbent is
appointed for a term of years, upon a compensation provided by
law, and in which he is required to give bond. If an attorney is
to be regarded as an officer, it is in a lower sense.
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We have had pressed upon us by the counsel opposed to the applicant, the decisions of the courts of Massachusetts, Wisconsin and
Illinois, and of the United States Court of Claims, adverse to such
an application. While not prepared to accede to all the general
views expressed in those decisions, we do not think it necessary to
go into d discussion of them, as we regard our statute, in view of
all the considerations affecting its construction, as too clear to admit
of any reasonable question as to the interpretation and effect which
we ought to give it.
In this opinion CARPENTER and LoomIs, JJ., concurred; PARDEE, J., dissented.
Although women have been admitted
to the bar in several states under statutes somewhat similar to that of Connecticut, the foregoing is believed to be
the only reported opinion in which such
right to admission has been sustained,
while there are at least four elaborate
opinions in the reports denying such
rigat. In the case of In re Bradwell,
535, decided in 1869, the ques55 Ill.
tion arose under a section of the Revised
Statutes of Illinois, providing as follows : "No person shall be permitted
to practise as an attorney or counsellor
without having previously
at law * *
obtained a license for that purpose from
some two of the justices of the-Supreme
Court. * * * No person shall be entitled to receive a license as aforesaid
until he shall have obtained a certificate
from the court of some county of his
good moral character." Another section of the revised statutes provided
that whenever any person was referred
to in the statute by words importing the
masculine gender, females as well as
males should be deemed to be included,
but that this rule should not apply when
there was anything in the subject or context repugnant to such construction.
The court held that women could not
be admitted, LAWRENOE, J., who delivered the opinion, saying: "When
the legislature gave to this court the
power of granting licenses to practise

law it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege should be
extended equally to men and women.
Neither has there been any legislation
since that period which would justify us
in presuming a change in the legislative
intent. . ", - We do not deem ourselves at liberty to exercise our power in
a mode never contemplated by the legislature and inconsistent with the usages
of courts of the common law from the
origin of the system to the present day.
But it is not merely an immense innovation in our own usages as a court
that we are asked to make. This step,
if taken by us, would mean that in the
opinion of this tribunal every civil office
ift this state may be filled by women ;
that it is in harmony with the spirit of
our Constitution and laws that women
should be made governors, judges and
sheriffs. This we are not prepared to
hold. In our opinion it is not the province of a court to attempt by giving a
new interpretation to an ancient statute
to introduce so important a change."
Mrs. Bradwell appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which
decided that the refusal to admit her to
the bar was not a violation of any provision of the United States Constitution : Bradwell v. Tle State, 16 Wall.
130.
In the case of In re Lockwood, 9 N. &
H. 346, decided in 1873, iMrs. Lock-
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wodd, a married woman, who had been
admitted to the bar in the courts of the
District of Columbia, applied for admission as an attorney in the United
States Court of Claims. The court
(NoTT, J., delivering the opinion),
held that married women were not entitled to admission at common law, and
that in the absence of any statute or
established precedents authorizing such
admission, the court was without power
to grant the application. Afterwards
Mrs. Lockwood applied to the Supreme
Court of the United States to be admitted to practise as an attorney, and her
application was denied, the following
being the entry on the record : "Upon
the presentation of this application the
chief justice said that notice of this application having been previously brought
to his attention, lie had been instructed
by the court to announce the following
decision upon it: By the uniform practice of the court, from its organization
to the present time, and by the fair construction of its rules, none but men are
admitted to practise before it as attorneys and counsellors. This is in accordance with immemorial usage in England
and the law and practice in all the states
until within a recent period, and the
court does not feel called upon to make
a change until such a change is required
by statute or a more extended practice
in the highest courts of the states."
This case is unreported but is cited in
the opinion in Rbbinson's Case, 131
Mass. 376, cited infra.
In Goodell's Case, 39 Wis. 232
(1875) the question arose under a
statute providing as follows: " No
person shall hereafter be admitted or
licensed to practise as an attorney of
any court of record -in this state except
in the manner hereinafter provided. To
entitle any such person to practise as
such attorney in the Circuit Courts of
this state he shall be flirst licensed by
order of one of the judges thereof made
in open court, and no such order shall

be made until the person applying for
such license shall have first been examined in open court, * * * nor unless

such person be a resident of this state,
more than twenty-one years of age and
of good moral character. * * * Any

person licensed by order of the court
* * *

shall be entitled to practise as

attorney. By another statute it was
provided "every word importing the
masculine gender only may extend and
be applied to females as well as males."
Under these statutes a motion was made
for the admission of an unniarried woman
to the bar. The motion was denied,
RYANx, C. J., delivering the opinion,
and holding that the terms of the former
statute applied to males only. With regard
to the operation of the statute relating to
the construction of words importing the
masculine gender, the court said: "TIhe
argument for the motion is simply this,
that the application of this permissive
rule of construction to a provision applicable in terms to males only has effect,
without other sign df legislative intent
to admit females to the bar, from which
the common law has excluded them ever
since courts have administered the common law. This is sufficiently startling,
but the argument cannot stop there.
Its logic goes far beyond the bar. The
same peremptory rule of construction
would reach all, or nearly all, the functions of the state government, would
obliterate almost all distinctions of sex
in our statutory corpus juris, and make
females eligible to almost all offices
under our statutes, municipal and state,
executive, legislative and judicial, except so far as the Constitution may
interpose a virile qualification. * * *
There is no sign nor symptom in our
statute law of any legislative imagination of such a radical change in the
economyof the state government. There
are many the other way; an irresistible
presumption that the legislature never
contemplated such confusion of functions
between the sexes. The application of
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the permissive rule of cistruction here

with the manifest intent of the legisla-

would not be in aid of the legislative
intention but in open defiance of it.
We cannot stultify the court by holding
that the legislature intended to bring
about per anibages a sweeping revolution
of social order by adopting a very inno-

ture or repugnant to the context of the
same statute, and among these rules
was one that "words importing the
masculine gender may be applied to
females."
The court (Grty, C. J.,
delivering te opinion), after an exhiustive review of the question, denied
the application, saying: " The intention
of the legislature in enacting a particular
statute is not to be ascertained by interpreting the statute by itself
alone and
according to the mere literal meaning
of its words. Every statute aust be
construed in connection with the whole
system of which it forms a part, and in
the light of the common law and of
previous statutes on the same subject.
And the legislature is not to be lightly
presumed to have intended to reverse
the policy of its predecessors or to introduce a fundamental change in longestablished principles of law."
Whatever may be the current of
judicial opinion, there can be no question but that the tendency of modem
legislation is strongly in favor of allowing women the privilege of admission to
the bar. It is worthy of note that each
one of the decisions above referred to
was followed by a statute granting to
women the privilege which the court
had denied (see Rev. Stat. Illinois,
chap. 13, sect. I; Act of Congress
Feb. 15th 1879, 20th star. 292 ; Rev.
Stat. Wisconsin, sect. 2586 ; 'Massachusetts Statutes of 1882, c. 139), and.
it seems probable that women will soon
be admitted to the bar throughout the
entire country. Whether any considerable number will avail themselves of the
privilege, and if they do, what will ba
the effect upon the administration of
justice, are questions which can only be
determined by future experience.
F. P. P.

cent rule of statutory construction."
In the course of this opinion the court
intimate that since the Constitution
vested in the courts the judicial power
of the state, the privilege of admission
to the bar was one exclusively within
the discretion of the courts independent
of and superior to legislative control,
and this intimation was renewed in the
matter of the subsequent application of
Mis G)olell (43 Wis. 693) in which,
however, the court, "in defbrence to the
wishes of a co-ordinate branch of the
government," admitted the applicant
under a statute passed after their former decision, and providing that no
person should be denied admission to
the bar on account of sex.
In Leia I.
Robinson's Case, 131
Mass. 376 (1881), the application was
made under a statute containing the
following provision : "IA citizen of this
state or an alien who has made the primary declaration of his intention to
become a citizen of the United States,
and who is an inhabitant of this state,
of the age of twenty-one years, and of
good moral character, may, on the
recommendation of an attorney, petition the Supreme Judicial or Supreme
Court to be examined for admission as
an attorney, whereupon the court shall
assign a time and place for the examination, and if satisfied with his acquirements and qualifications lie shall be
admitted."
Another statute laid down
certain rules for the construction of statutes which were to be observed, "unless
such construction would be inconsistent
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SMITH v. THE PEOPLE.
Possession of property recently stolen is prima fade evidence of guilt, and is
sufficient to warrant a conviction for its larceny, unless the attending circumstances
or other evidence so far overcome the presumption thus raised as to create a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
On the trial of one for larceny of goods, the possession of which by the accused
four days after the theft was not disputed, the court instructed the jury " that the
possession of stolen property soon after the commission of the theft is prima fade
evidence that the person in whose possession it is found is guilty of the wrongful
taking, and is sufficient to warrant a conviction, unless the other evidence in the
case or the surrounding circnmstances are such as to raise a reasonable doubt of such
guilt:" Held, that the instruction was proper, and not open to the objection that it
assumed the existence of any fact necessary to be proven which was disputed on
the trial.
WIT

of error to the Criminal Court of Cook county.

Forrest

ay, for plaintiff in error.

Luther Laflin Mills and Geo.

. Ingham, contra.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCOTT, J.-Accused was indicted for larceny of a wagon, and on a
trial had in the Criminal Court of Cook county, was found guilty, and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary. Evidence
was introduced tending to establish facts that show his guilt,
and it is not claimed that on the testimony found in the record a
new trial should be awarded had there been no error in the instructions given on behalf of the prosecution calculated to mislead the
jury. The guilt or innocence of the accused is always a question
for the jury, and their finding will seldom be disturbed, unless
where it is manifest they have been. misled by the instructions of
the court to the prejudice of defendant.
The instruction given on behalf of the People, the correctness
of which is called in question both in the argument and on the
assignment of error, is as follows :
"The court instructs the jury that the possession of stolen
property soon after the commission of the theft is prima facie evidence that the person in whose possession it is found is guilty of the
wrongful taking, and is sufficient to warrant a conviction, unless
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the other evidence in the case or the surrounding circumstances
are such as to raise a reasonable doubt of such guilt."
There is no doubt there are contradictory decisions on this branch
of the law, but in this state it is certainly settled that possession
of property recently stolen is prima facie evidence of guilt, and is
sufficient to warrant a conviction unless the attending circumstances
or other evidence so far overcome the presumption thus raised as to
create a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, when, of
course, an acquittal should follow. This principle is so definitely
determined by the decision of this court in Comfort v. The People,
54 Ill. 404, it need not now be discussed as a new question.
The instruction as given states the law nearly in the precise
terms it is declared by this court to be. Nor is it subject to the
objection that it assumes any fact to be proved that was a matter of
contention at the trial. It can not be said it assumes the existence
of any fact, unless it was the possession of the property recently after
it was stolen. That fact was proven by the People, and the accused
admitted it came to his possession within four days after it was
proven to have been stolen from the owner. Even if the instruction assumes the property was found in the possession of defendant
shortly after it was stolen, that fact was not in dispute, and it certainly did the accused no harm. It was fairly left to the jury to
find whether the other evidence and circumstances proven either by
defendant or the People, sufficiently overcame the presumption of
guilt raised by proof of possession of the stole4 property shortly
after the theft had been committed.
The facts the evidence tends to establish show the guilt of the
accused past all reasonable doubt, and as the law applicable to the
facts was fairly given to the jury, there is no ground for setting
aside the verdict. The judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
The decisions in the various States upon
the question as to what is the effect in

whether the mere fact offinding the stolen
property in the possession of the accused

a trial for larceny, of proving the possession of the stolen property by the accused,
are certainly numerous, and in some of
the States the difference in the language
used by the various courts is very great,
hut it will generally be found that the
authorities differ very little in principle,
The mooted points seem to be First,

is sufficient of itself to warrant a conviction, or in other words what is
the strength of ie presumption raised
by such a finding. -Second, whether
the presumption raised is one of law to
be decided by the court or one of fact to
be decided by the jury; and Third.
whether, when it is shown that the
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accused had recent and exclusive posses-

cused, or some circumstance not con.

sion of the stolen property, the burden
of proof is not shifted and thrown upon
tile defendant, making it necessary for
him to prove how he came by the property or to be considered guilty of the
offence.
As to the first question, it is generally
admitted that the mere proof of the possession of the article stolen, without any
evidence as to whether that possession
was either recent or exclusive, is not of
itself sufficient to raise a presumption of
guilt strong enough to call upon the prisoner for a defence. The necessary circumstances which obviously must surround the possession must also be shown;
the questions-how recent was the possession-was it exclusive--what was the
nature of the articles-were they such as
passed rapidlyfrom hand to hand-or were
they so marked that they could not have
been transferred without raising suspicion
-must be answered before any rule upon
the subject of the strength of the presumption can be stated. It is but natural
to suppose that when the rule " that tle
possession of stolen property is p-na
.facie evidence of guilt," is laid down
either by text writers or by the courts,
without other qualific.%ions, the attending facts must also have been taken into
consideration.
The best general rule upon the subject
seems to be that proof of the possession of stolen property is one of the
circumstances which go to show the guilt
of the person accused and is to be looked
upon in the same light as any other fact
in he case. It may be a circumstance
which when coupled with the surrounding facts, will be strong enough to raise
a presumption of guilt, and, if uncontradicted, will justify the conviction of
the person on trial ; on the other hand it
may not raise, even when the surrounding
circumstances are proved, a presumption
strong enough to hold the prisoner, unless it is supported by other facts, such as
the denial of the I ossessioj by the ac-

nected merely with the possession itself.
The presumption raised depends for its
strength enhrely upon the attending circumstances, or the answers to the questions which I have before enumerated.
No fixed rule can be laid down to cover
all the cases that may arise; it is a presumnption not capable of being governed
by general rules, each case differing
from another in the facts that make the
foundation for the rule that is to govern
them.
The two extremes of the law which
have been held are-on the one hand,
that the possession is not evidence, to
convict of the crime: People v. Gassaway, 23 Cal. 51 ; The People v. Chambers, 18 Id. 383 ;-on the other hand
that it is sufficient to convict if not
contradicted (State v. Weston, 9 Conn.
537). These rulings have been criticised
(Knidcerboder v. People, 43N. Y. 177),
and it has been asserted that Greenleaf
is responsible at least for the former decisions by reason of the law which he
lays down in the third book of his commentaries.
As general rules they are undoubtedly
bad, but when they are applied to cases
where the facts authorize them, they may
be both equally sound. The first maybe
sound when there is nothing but the bare
possession, proved, without anything else;
and this is what is meant by Greenleaf,
when he lays down the rule in the 3d
31 ; or it may be
volume of his work,
correct in the well-known case of a stolen
negotiable note, where possession even a
short time after the theft would not carry
with it a presumption of guilt. The
soundness of the second rule, when applied to an individual case, cannot be
better illustrated than by quoting an
unreported case in Pennsylvania.
The prisoner was charged with the
larceny of a rope; the evidence produced
proved that the rope was hanging in front
of a store ; that the prisoner was seen
just before he got to the pavement in
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front of which the rope was hanging,
and was arrested on the pavement below,
walking away with the rope in his hands.
No one saw him take the rope ; it was
merely a case of the proof of the possession of stolen property hy the accused,
but no one would dispute the rule that
posses'ion in this ease would carry with it
such a presumption of guilt as would convict the prisoner of the offence.
The general weight of the authorities
therefore seem to bear out the rule that
the proof of the possession of stolen property carries with it a presumption of
guilt strong or weak, in proportion to the
recentness of the theft, the exclusiveness
of the possession and the nature of the
articles stolen, and this presumption is to
be looked upon as any other fact tending
to show the prisoner's guilt of the crime
for which lie stands indicted : Coammonw alth v. M1ontgomery, 11 Met. 534;
(osmmwelth v. McGorty, 114 Mass.
293; Englonan v. State, 2 Ind. 91,
97; 2 Starkie's Ev. 615; Wharton's
Crim. Ev.,
758, and casqs cited; I
Greenl. on Ev., . 34 ; 9 Cox Criminal
Law Cases 465, &c.
In regard to the second question, as to
whether the presumption is one of law or
fact there seems to b6 little dispute.
There have been cases in some of the
courts in which it has been held that it is
the duty of the court to instruct the jury
as to whether the presumption has been
raised or not, and as to its effect and
degree of strength : Pennsylvania v. Stephn Myers, Addison's Reports 321;
State v. Brown, 75 Missouri 317
references in Whart. Crim. Ev., 758,
and Best's Ev., P 322, but these decis,ons have almost all been overruled. (See
State v. Hodge, 50 N. I. 510, and
eases cited; The Statev. Hodge, 53 Ind.
340 ; also see Wharton, Greenleaf and
Best's Evidence before quoted.) All the
authorities both in this country and in
England agree in holding the presumption is purely one of fact; that it is the
province of the jury to determine by

weighing the attending circumstances,
whether there has been apraafaciecase
made out, or whether the presumption
raised is strong enough to overcome the
rebutting testimony and prove beyond
all reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.
The presumption is not one to
which the arbitrary rules applicable to
presumptions of law can be applied ; the
whole question of the presumption in
each case depending solely upon the facts
as found by the jury in each particular
instance : Conamonwealth v. Jfontgomery,
11 Met. (Mass.) 534, &c. ; The State v.
Richart, 57 Iowa 245, and authorities
quoted above.
Upon the last point-as to whether the
proof of recent and exclusive possession
of stolen property does not throw upon
the prisoner the burden of proof-there
is certainly some difference of opinion.
Some writers have laid down the rule
most explicitly, that upon such proof,
unless the defendant shows how he came
by the goods, or proves his innocence,
the burden of proof being on him, there
should be a verdict of guilty: Best on
Presumptions, 47 Law Lib. (1. S.)
804 ; Knickerbocker v. People, 43 N. Y.
177. Others have said that it is not
possible that the burden of proof should
change no matter how strong the evidence
of the prosecution may be, that it is a
fundamental principle of the law that the
proof offered by the prosecution must of'
itself be strong enough to convict the
defendant before he is called upon to
make his defence and that the case cannot
be made out by reason of anything that
the defendant may or may not do, that
the burden of proof is always upon the
prosecution and that it is erroneous to
say that upon proof of a certain fact
that burden is shifted to the defendant:
Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315, &-c.
It is true that the proof of arecent and
exclusive possession, if not rebutted by
any evidence produced by the prisoner,
may be enough to convict him, but it
does not seem proper to say that the
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burden of proof, for this reason, as a
matter oflaw, is always, upon such proof,

changed. It may well be said that the
non-contradiction of the evidence of possession or the want of an explanation
of how the accused became possessed of
the property, tends to decrease the
probabilities of his innocence and that in
proportion to increase or strengthen the
evidence of his guilt, but unless the
prosecution by the evidence it has produced has shown beyond reasonable
doubt that the prisoner is guilty, the
burden of proof is not thrown upon him
to prove that he is innocent. This is
probably what is meant by the writers

who assert in the technical language of
the criminal courts, that the burden of
proof is changed upon proof of exclusive
and recent possession of the stolen property. The rule that" Efi incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat" is too -well
established to be the subject of controversy.
It may therefore be said, in conclusion,
that unless the recent exclusive possession proved is, under the circumstances, enough to show the prisoner
guilty beyond all reasonable doubt the
burden of proof is not thrown upon him.
Ciaur-s BIDDLE.

Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
WIIITMORE v. BALL.
On a motion for a new trial affidavits of jurors are admissible, even in a civil case,
to show the misconduct of the jury after retiring, so as.to vitiate the verdict.
If the jurors decline on the application of a party to give an affidavit of the facts,
the trial-judge should, on motion of such party, call the jurors before him by process
and examine them in open court touching the alleged misconduct.
If he has refused so to do, the Supreme Court will, where the affidavit of the
applicant party showed an admission of misconduct by jutrors, and the same was
not denied by the opposite party nor contradicted by the jurors, award a new trial.

THIS was an action for libel in which, after verdict, the defendant moved for a new trial and read his own affidavit stating his
grounds as follows: That A. M. Stoddard, one of the jury, after
the jury had retired for consultation, stated to it that to his knowledge W. S. Trask, who wrote the article in the "Ledger," about
which this controversy is, had prejudice and malice against the
plaintiff, because when plaintiff had charge of the European Hotel,
he had refused to give Trask free dinners or free meals, or free
board at his house; that the "Public Ledger," which published the
article complained of, and of which Whitmore is the owner, had published other articles defamatory of individuals, and that he wanted
to stop it; that said Whitmore had published unjust and false articles about a society of which he (the juror) was a member, and that
he had not forgotten it, and that he wanted to punish Whitmore for
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these things. He further said that the witnesses who had given
damaging testimony as to the character of the plaintiff and of the
hotel he kept, he did not believe; that he had lived at the hotel and
knew better, &c.
The affidavit further stated that such statements made in the jury
room were calculated to mislead and prejudice the jury, and afflant
believed did have an important effect and influence on the jury in
inducing it to yield to Stoddard's suggestions and give a verdict
for damages ; that without them, he believed the verdict would have
been for him, or at least for merely nominal damages.
The affidavit disclosed the names of three jurors, from whom the
facts of Stoddard's conduct bad been learned, but who refused to
voluntarily give their affidavits, but said they would make the statements if called by the court or as the court might order. The court
below refused to permit counsel to examine the said jurors in open
court, as requested, holding it improper to do so in the absence of
affidavits from the jurors themselves, and informed defendant's
counsel that the court would wait for an affidavit from a juror and
would consider it if presented. The court was then requested to
examine the jurors or any of them touching the evidence of Stoddard in the jury room. This was refused, the court holding it to
be improper in the absence of affidavits of some of the jurors
themselves.
Judgment being entered on the verdict defendant took this writ
of error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TURNEY, J.-That a verdict may be attacked and set aside for
the misconduct of a juror, established by the testimony of his fellows, is too well established in this state to be disturbed now.
We know of no reason in public policy why it should be otherwise. It certainly has a controlling tendency to insure purity and
fairness in jury trials. The statements of Stoddard as discovered
in the affidavit were calculated to, and no doubt did, prejudice the
jury and incline its minds to a verdict against the plaintiff in
error.
Treating the affidavit as prima facie true, it is certain that
Stoddard was the friend and advocate of the defendant in error,
and that a fair and impartial trial could not be had at his hands.
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A strong presumption arises, that his conduct in the jury room
brought about the verdict.
This court has several times said, the better practice is, to examine the juror in open court. Such course gives the adverse side
full opportunity to test the witness and place before the court the
facts in their true light. No room is left for sliding over or concealing facts, which, if left out of an affidavit, put on the matter a
face wholly different from the truth. In this case the accusing
jurors had refused to make written affidavits, and we know of no
rule by which court or counsel could have compelled them to it.
It was in the power of the court to have compelled them to an0
swer questions.
In this case it appears that the affidavit had been filed long
enough to give the plaintiff and counsel ample time to examine it
and prepare to defend against it before the action of the court was
invoked on inquiring into the conduct of the offending juror.
This fact excites a decidedly strong suspicion that the facts charged
could not be rebutted and we will look to it as a circumstance in
the nature of a confession on the part of the plaintiff below of
the truth of the charges. Under all the circumstances we are of
opinion the court should have examined the jurors offered, or a
sufficient number of them, some of whom were present under 'subpoena, to have shown the truth or falsehood of the facts charged
and their influence upon the jury in arriving at its verdict. It
was in the legitimate power of the court to have compelled the attendance and deposition of each juror while counsel and parties
were powerless to compel written affidavits.
COOPER, J., dissented.

Reversed.

Baxter 229; Dunnaway v. Sharon, 3
Id. 206; Richardson v. McLemore, 5
Id. 586; 1olle'v. Bachman, 5 Lea 153;
of evidence by jurors to vitiate their own
verdicts is peculiar. In accord with the the same rule prevailing uniformly in
civil and criminal trials. But, contrary
English and Federal cases it is held here,
to the present practice in England, and
as in the other states, that, on a motion
for a new trial, the court will not hear in the other states, save Ohio perhaps,
the affidavit of jurors will be received to
the affidavits of jurors to impeach their
show their misconduct, such as receiving
verdicts, because they had misunevidence ex parte, or holding private
derstood or disregarded the charge of
the court, or had misconceived or mis- consultation with either party to the
taken the evidence in, the case : Norris suit after retiring, or resorting to chance
to reach a verdict. This course pursues
v. State, 3 Hun 333; Saunder v.
the ancient practice prevailing in England
Fuller, 4 Id. 516 ; Made v. Ordway, 1

The doctrine and practice of courts in
Tennessee in regard to the admissibility
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down to the time of Lord TLKxsrELD,
who changed the practice there in 1770.
As late as 1851 there seems to have
been no established rule as to the admission or rejection of such affidavits in the
federal courts. TANLY, C. J., then
said : "It would, perhaps, be hardly
safe to lay down any general rule on
'this subject. Unquestionably such evidence ought to be received with great
caution:"
Unit,d States v. Reid, 12
How. 361 ; since which no ruling seems
to have been made in the Supreme
Court upon the practice. In Ladd v.
lWilson, 12 Cranch Cir. Ct. 305, and
Mile v. Bioy, 1 Or. 90, the affidavits
were refsced, however.
In Ohio jurors' affidavits have been
held admissible to a limited extent in
exceptional cases, " where life or even
liberty is threatened by misconduct of
the jury :" Fartcr v. State, 2 Warden's
Ohio Rep. 54.
The practice of admitting them in
Tennessee first received sanction in a
capital case (Crawford v. State, 2 Yer.
60), in which it is probable file bias of
the court was not a little infavorem vitm,
though the case received elaborate investigation, and was evidently well considered.
Indeed, in the next case
(Booby v. State, 4 Hun 111), the court
say the case of Crawford was examined
with much care, and as evidence of the
wisdom of their decision, take manifest
pleasure in saying that on the second
trial Crawford was acquitted : Id. 116.
In Booby's Case the new trial, though
refused on the ground that a juror had
bet on the verdict, was granted on the
ground that a juror's affidavit disclosed
that the verdict ad resulted from statements made by a juror to the prejudice
of the prisoner after the jury had retired ;
and the court places much stress upon
the idea that this misconduct was in palpable violation of the constitutional provision, "that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused hath a right * " * to meet
the witnesses face to face." Craford's
VOL. XXX.-94

Case was decided in 1821 and Booby's
in 1833 ; and, thenceforward, so far as
the reports show. though the practice of
admitting juror's affidavits was uniform,
it was allowed only in criminal cases,
till 1872, when the court, in Wade v.
Ordway, 1 Baxter 229, on elaborate
consideration, extended it to civil cases ;
and ever since the affidavits of jurors
have been held admissible to impeach
their own verdicts, though, as the courts
say, "they are to be received with grat
caution," because they tend to defeat
solemn public acts, open a door to tamper with jurors after verdict, and permit
a dissatisfied juror .to destroy a verdict
after he had once under oath assented to
it. And in fish v. Cantrel, 2 Heisk.
578, NICHOLSON, C. J., remarks : " It
is time that circuit judges had ceased to
allow the affidavits of jurors, as to the
grounds of their verdicts, to be read on
motions for new trials, unless in extraordinary cases."
In Mann v. State, 3 Head 374, it is
said that, "the circuit judges should
cause the impeaching witnesses to be
thoroughly examined in open court,
instead of acting upon their prepared
affidavits, though sworn to in open
court. This would be the best and
safest practice to avoid imposition."
This remark was made in regard to
an attempted impeachment of jurors
propter aff'ectum, but seems equally applicable to a case where the impeachment is for misconduct during trial.
The singularity of the principal case
consists in the fact that the verdict was
set aside without the adavit or testimony
of the jurors, upon the ex parte affidavit
of the plaintiff to a hearsay statement of
what occurred in the jury room, which
could probably have been proven only by
the jurors. Defendant failed to produce
and the court declined to call the jurors
to contradict the hearsay charge of misconduct, and thereupon the affidavit was
taken for confessed and the new trial
awarded.
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In Drummond v. Leslie, 5 Blatchf.

tions of jurors as to their conduct during

453, a new trial was refused which was
sought on the affidavit of third persons
as to what jurors had said impeaching
their verdict. And in Heath v. Conway, 1 Bibb 398, a motion for process
to bring in jurors, to testify of misconduct alleged against the jury, was denied,
Judge B.DB remarking: "The court
should be very cautious in collecting a
jury after they are dismissed from their
oaths, with intent to set aside their verdict, for ' no one knows whom they meet
on the way.' " The power to recall
them seems to be admitted, but on
account of public policy it was refused.
Similar rulings were made in Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. Cir. Ct. 147,
and
lolnead v. Corcoran, 2 Cranch
Cir. Ct. 119. But in Howard v. Cobb,
3 Day 309, the court declared that
neither a juror nor the officer of the
jury could be compelled to testify as to
alleged misconduct of the jury in separating without leave of court before returning a verdict.
The only previous Tennessee case on
this subject leaves this question open. In
Stone v. State, 4 Hun 27, the prisoner
had exhibited affidavits of third parties as
tojmisconduct of the jury, and moved for
compulsory process to bring in the jurors
to testify in regard to it. On argument
the motion was overruled ; but the court
heard statements made by the jurors voluntarily. This action of the circuit judge
was neither criticised nor affirmed; but
it was observed by TunrEY, J., that "if
hearsay evidence of misconduct in jurors
might be received to set aside a verdict,
verdicts would, indeed, be worth but little ;" and "a new trial never has been,
and it may safely be predicted never will
be, granted upon the reported observa-

the trial."
That was in 1843.
The decision that "it was in the legitimate power of the court to compel
the attendance and deposition of each
juror" seems peculiar and in conflict
with the current of decision in other
states, but is probably the natural and
necessary result of the peculiar state of
the law in Tennessee as to the admissibility of jurors' affidavits or testimony in
impeachment of their own verdicts.
In other states, applications to compel
jurors to give evidence to impeach their
verdicts have been denied, because such
evidence is not admissible. Yet if the
fact of misconduct by the jury is satisfactorily shown by competent evidence,
a new trial results.
In this state the
evidence of the juror is admissible to
show the misconduct; and therefore the
courts will aid the complaining party
by process, if necessary, to procure this
competent evidence as well as any other
that will assist in the administration of
justice.
The Code of Tennessee provides, sect.
3167, that "if the judgment or decree
of the inferior court be reversed, the appellate court shall give such judgment or
make such decree as should have been
rendered in the inferior court;" and,
sect. 3170, that "Ithe court shall also, in
all cases where, in its opinion, complete
justice cannot be had by reason of some
defect in the record * * * remand the
cause to the court below for further proceedings, with proper directions to efflectuate the objects of the order, and upon
such terms as may be deemed right."
Why was this case not remanded with
directions to the circuit judge to hear the
evidence of the jurors, before acting on
the motion for a new trial?
H. H. INGERSOLL.

